Infoblox
NEXT LEVEL NETWORKING

Effectiveness of DNS as an enforcement point for security and content filtering service

Date: November 29, 2018

Motivations and Fundamental Questions



Case 1: European Mobile and Fixed operator

Methodology and Results



61% coverage

- Including newly observed domains (NOD)
- NOD causes false positives for consumers
- 34% coverage when NOD excluded

Most malware in NODs

- 95% coverage on Botnet
- 62% coverage on Malware (33% w/o NOD)
- 60%+ coverage on phishing

Coverage 50% to 90%

- Varies based on categories and grouping
- Accuracy is a major factor
- No significant difference between URLs and domain-only

Case 2: European Mobile and Fixed operator

Methodology and Results



94% coverage

- Including newly observed domains (NOD)
- <1% false positives

Most phishing in NODs

- Different NOD vendors catch and time out threats differently

Coverage 84%

- Unknown domains to be measured in a second step

Conclusions

Adjust Methodology for Market	• Coverage and false positive impact heavily dependent on use case (consumer vs corporate)
Multi-vendor Approach for Threat Intel	• Non-uniform coverage across feeds from same vendor • Vendor bias can give false sense of security
URLs are NOT Better than Domains	• Benchmark against AV and DPI shows no significant coverage gap


Thank You
Asante
Shukria
Dhanyavadagalu
Kiitos
Maake
Vinaka
köszönöm
Dankscheen
спасибо
Manana
Dankon
Kasih
Matondo
Kam Sah Hammida
감사합니다
Mauruuru
Biyan
Dank Je
Terima
Taiku
Tack
Blagodaram
Ngiyabonga
Dziekuje
Chokrane
Diolch i Chi
Grazie
Arigato
Juspaxar
Mochchakkeram
Gracias
Khap
Khun
Paldies
Tingki
Bedankt
Dakujem
धन्यवाद
நன்றி
cảm ơn bạn
Gratias
Tibi
Ua Tsaug Rau Koj
Grazas
Kia Ora
Obrigado
Di Ou Mèsi
Děkuji
Nirringrazzjak
Kop
Djiere Dieuf
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Hvala
ありがとう
Rahmat
Nuwun
Matur
Welalin
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Eskerrik Asko
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Danke
Go Raibh Maith Agat
Merci
Najis Tuke
Salamat
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